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Gender Discrimination in Job Ads: Theory and Evidence
* 
 
We study firms’ advertised gender preferences in a population of ads on a Chinese internet 
job board, and interpret these patterns using a simple employer search model. The model 
allows us to distinguish firms’ underlying gender preferences from firms’ propensities to 
restrict their search to their preferred gender. The model also predicts that higher job skill 
requirements should reduce the tendency to gender-target a job ad; this is strongly confirmed 
in our data. We also find that firms’ underlying gender preferences are highly job-specific, 
with many firms requesting men for some jobs and women for others, and with one third of 
the variation in gender preferences within firm*occupation cells. 
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Not that long ago, it was commonplace for U.S. employers to explicitly 
discriminate on the basis of age, race and sex in their job advertisements.
1  While these 
practices are now illegal in most developed countries, the vast majority of the world’s 
population still works in labor markets where such ads are permitted.  In this paper, we 
use this opportunity to study gender discrimination in a large sample of job 
advertisements taken from an internet job board in China, with a view to understanding 
the practice and shedding light on the underlying sources of gender differentials in labor 
markets more generally.  To guide our analysis, we develop a simple model of employer 
search from two populations in the presence of application processing costs.   
 
Applied to the context of gender, our model unsurprisingly predicts that increases 
in a firm’s preferences for men in a job should raise the share of ads for that job that 
explicitly request male applicants, and reduce the share that request women.  Of greater 
interest, the model also predicts that a set of four ‘search-related’ factors act in a different 
way:  Increases in application processing costs or in the expected number of applications 
should raise the likelihood that firms will impose gender restrictions against both men 
and women, while increases in the idiosyncratic variance of applicant productivity and in 
the job’s skill level have the opposite effect (reducing the frequency of discrimination in 
both directions).  We test the latter prediction in our data, and also use the model to 
interpret the cross-sectional relationship between job and firm characteristics on the one 
hand, and advertised discrimination on the other.   
 
We find, first of all, that explicit, advertised gender discrimination is 
commonplace in our data.  In particular, over one third of the firms that advertised on the 
board during our twenty-week sample period placed at least one ad stipulating a preferred 
gender.  Thus, when it is legal to express such preferences, a large share of employers 
does so, presumably either for taste reasons, or because employers expect men and 
women to be differently productive in the job they are advertising.  Second, as predicted 
by our model, we find overwhelming evidence that higher skill requirements –whether 
measured by the job’s education level, the required level of experience, or the offered 
wage—are associated with lower levels of advertised gender discrimination, whether in 
favor of men or women.  While previous authors (Becker 1957; Black and Strachan 
2001) have argued that product market competition may be a potent deterrent to 
discrimination, our results suggest that rising skill demands may play a similar (and 
potentially more powerful) role, both in explaining the cross-sectional incidence of 
discrimination across jobs, and in understanding long-term trends and international 
differences in the extent to which explicit discrimination is accepted and practiced.   
 
Using our model, we are also able to estimate the effects of a wide variety of firm 
and job characteristics on firms’ underlying gender preferences.  For example, large 
firms, state-owned firms, and firms seeking workers with high levels of experience tend 
to prefer men.  Foreign-owned firms, and firms hiring for certain customer-contact 
occupations tend to prefer women, especially (in the latter case) tall, attractive ones.  At 
the same time, we detect no association between a job’s education requirements or its 
                                                 
1 See Darity and Mason (1998) for examples of such ads in the U.S.     2
offered wage and firms’ underlying relative preferences for men versus women in that 
job.  Thus, all of the negative association between a job’s offered wage and the 
probability that women are invited to apply in our data is attributed to search-related 
factors that vary with job skill levels.      
 
Finally, we find that firms’ gender preferences are highly job-specific.  For 
example, over a quarter of the firms that advertised a gender preference requested men 
for some positions and women for others.  More specifically, while firm fixed effects 
explain about a third of the variation in gender preferences in our data, neither firm-wide 
preferences towards one gender, nor inter-firm differentials in occupation mix, are very 
powerful explanations of the pattern of advertised gender preferences.  Instead, ads for 
the same occupation are often targetted at men in some firms and at women in others, and 
one third of the variation in firms’ gender preferences is within firm*occupation cells.  
Overall, rather than, for example, restricting women’s access to highly skilled jobs, 
Chinese firms mostly use targetted job ads to divide their pool of less skilled positions 
into ‘male’ versus ‘female’ positions.   
 
2. Related Literature 
 
  To our knowledge, Darity and Mason (1998) are the only economists who have 
examined discrimination in U.S. job ads; they reproduce examples of ads from 1960 
newspapers, but do not conduct any statistical analysis.  Goldin (1990, 2006) examines 
data from a Department of Labor Women’s Bureau survey of employers concerning their 
1939 employment policies for office workers.  In a sample of several hundred firms, she 
finds that a majority reserved some positions for men, and others for women.  Lawler and 
Bae (1998) is the only article we know of that studies discrimination in a recent sample of 
job ads.  Their focus is on the impact of a multinational firm’s home country culture on 
its stated gender preferences in a sample of 902 ads placed in an English-language 
newspaper in Thailand.
2     
 
  Given the lack of previous research on advertised discrimination, it is perhaps 
useful to contrast ad-based indicators of discrimination to more well-known measures, 
such as those generated by audit-type studies (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004).  
Bertrand and Mullainathan submitted resumes to U.S. employers in response to 
newspaper job ads, with the respondent’s apparent race randomly assigned via race-
specific first names.  They found large differentials in callback rates for identical black 
and white resumes.  Full audit studies, such as Neumark (1996), carry this procedure one 
step further and send matched, trained actors to interview for jobs in response to the 
callbacks.  
 
Ad-based indicators of discrimination differ from audit-type indicators in two 
ways that have opposite implications for how much discrimination we should expect to 
observe.  First, because ads are formulated before resumes arrive, ad-based measures do 
not condition on the information that appears in a worker’s resume.
3  For this reason, if 
                                                 
2 Banerjee et al. (2009) study caste and other preferences in a small sample of marriage ads in India. 
3 Indeed, the fact that no resumes are submitted (and no actors need to be trained) can be seen as an 
advantage of the ad-based approach:  their comparability, realism and representativeness  is not at issue.  
Another key advantage is cost:  our data is collected costlessly by a web crawler; thus our sample consists   3
the employer expects to receive lower quality resumes from the ‘disfavored’ group, firms 
might choose to engage in discriminatory job advertising even when audit-type studies 
would show little or no discrimination.  Second, however, according to our model, 
discrimination in job ads should only be observed when an employer’s preferences 
against (or prior beliefs about) a particular group are intense enough to exceed a strictly 
positive threshold. This is because targetting an ad causes a discrete drop in the number 
of applications received, by discouraging an entire group from applying. This feature of 
ad-based discrimination suggests, in contrast, that we should see it less frequently than in 
audit studies where even small employer preferences are in principle detectable.     
 
A third and final difference between ad-based and ‘traditional’ measures is that 
advertised discrimination necessarily involves a conscious decision by the employer to 
invite only one group to apply.  In contrast, audit studies should detect both the conscious 
choices and unconscious biases of employers.
4  In sum, we should expect firms to post 
discriminatory ads when they consciously expect large differentials in both the observed 
(in a resume or interview) and unobserved (productivity and taste-related) characteristics 
of two groups;  these conditions differ from the conditions in which we would be more 
likely to observe discrimination using more familiar methods, such as audit studies or 
wage regressions.   
 
Finally, we note --as is widely recognized-- that neither ad-based nor audit-based 
measures of discrimination on their own can distinguish whether discrimination is 
statistical (i.e. based on actual or perceived between-group differences in average 
productivity that are unobserved by the investigator) or taste-based.  Distinguishing these 
sources of discrimination requires additional evidence, for example on the amount of 
customer contact in the job, or the amount of product market competition faced by the 
employer.  We examine such evidence here, but the fact that our discrimination measure 
is derived from job ads does not in itself confer any advantages or disadvantages in 
distinguishing among these motivations for discriminating.   
 
Theoretically, our model draws on Becker’s (1957) seminal model of labor 
market equilibrium in the presence of discrimination, and on its recent elaboration by 
Charles and Guryan (2008).  We generalize both these models by introducing search 
frictions and application processing costs:  as in Altonji and Pierret (2001), firms in our 
model can use gender or other demographics as coarse screens for applicant ability; in 
our case we formally model firms’ decisions regarding whether or not to use such 
screens.  Becker’s model –where essentially all jobs are segregated in equilibrium-- is a 
special case of ours where the idiosyncratic variation in worker quality approaches zero, 
or where application processing costs approach infinity.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of over one million observations, compared to about 5,000 in Bertrand-Mullainathan and much smaller 
numbers in most audit studies. The larger sample size, in turn, lets us go beyond the study of a few specific 
occupations to paint a broad statistical portrait of explicit gender-targetting in this labor market, across 
occupations, industries, and firm types.   
4 See Crosby et al. (1980) for a review of studies of unconscious bias.     4
  Our model also relates to a literature on optimal search and recruiting that has 
been inspired by Mortensen and Pissaridies (1994), among others.
5  In most of these 
models, employers’ strategy space is highly restricted --for example in many cases firms’ 
only choices are whether to enter the market and what wage to post—and workers are 
identical.
6  Further, while advertising by firms is sometimes modelled (e.g. Moen, 1997; 
Menzio 2007), the content of ads is typically restricted to announcements of wages or 
working conditions.  Thus, to our knowledge, the theoretical search literature has not yet 
considered the possible optimality of advertised hiring restrictions, which invite some 
(but not all) worker types to apply.  While our theoretical treatment is a simple one, it 
may prove a useful starting point for the modelling of employers’ equilibrium decisions 
regarding how broadly (across worker types) to search, which to our knowledge have not 
received much attention in this literature.  
   
3. A Simple Model of Discrimination in Job Ads 
 
Consider a firm soliciting applications for a single vacant position; applications 
can come from two distinct groups, labelled M and F.  Let the net value to the firm of an 
individual applicant, j, in a job with ‘standard’ skill requirements be  
 
(1)    ,  ,   j
G
j v U    ) , ( F M G
 
where the εj represent independent draws from a distribution with cdf  F(εj).  A worker’s 
net value in a job with skill requirement θ is assumed to be  j U  .   Importantly, the 
gender difference in baseline net value, v
M - v
F, includes not only between-group 
differences in revenue productivity in the job, but also differences in  employer tastes, 
and in expected wage costs between the groups.  We explore these differential sources of 
expected net value theoretically at the end of the current section, and empirically in 
Sections 5 and 6.  For now we simply work with v
M - v
F  as a summary index of all these 
factors for a particular job, and use employers’ “preferences towards men” or “tastes for 




  Simple, closed-form solutions for the model are available when we assume a 
convenient functional form for F(εj).  Specifically, let F(εj) be type-I extreme value, with 
F(εj) = exp(-exp(-εj/β)).  It follows that Var(εj) = β
2π
2/6, and E(εj) = βγ, where γ is Euler’s 
constant (≈.577).  The firm is assumed to choose the individual worker with the highest 
                                                 
5 Our research also relates to microdata studies of vacancy durations, such as Van Ours and Ridder (1992, 
1993), and Van Ommeren and Russo (2009).  To our knowledge, only two papers in this literature --
Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) and Van Ours and Ridder (1991)—have studied employers’ 
advertised job restrictions (in their case, minimum education requirements) empirically.  However, unlike 
us, both of these papers treat advertised requirements as exogenous vacancy characteristics, rather than as a 
choice variable for the employer.   
6 For an excellent recent exception, see Teulings and Gautier (2004).  Lang¸ Manove and Dickens (2005) 
develop a posted-wage search model with two worker types; they show that small employer preferences for 
one group can generate large equilibrium differentials in outcomes.  Rosen’s (1997) model has two worker 
types and assumes workers are better informed about match quality than firms; discriminatory equilibria 
can arise even when firms have no group-based preferences.   Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) consider a 
world with heterogeneous employee types, but firms cannot (and do not want to) invite only a subset of the 
types to apply.     5
total value, Uj, from its pool of applicants.  The only nontrivial choice facing the firm is 
which groups (M, F, or both) to invite to apply; this choice takes into account that it costs 




  Formally, the firm chooses D
M and D
F to maximize:   
 
(2)  Π ≡ Emax(Uj; D
M, D
F)  -  D





F) is a (0,1) indicator for inviting men (women) to apply, and Emax(Uj; D
M, 
D
F) gives the expected value of the maximum value of Uj drawn from the sample of 
applicants defined by D
M and D
F.  M and F denote the numbers of applications that 
would arrive from the two groups, if invited.   
 
Lemma 1.   
 
(a) The expected value of the highest Uj in a sample of size G drawn from a single group, 








G + βγ is the expected net value of a single applicant from group G.   
 
(b) The expected value of the highest Uj drawn from the combined sample of all 
applicants in a job with standard skill requirements, is:   
 
(4)  C U
F M


























where C=M+F and  δ = M/(M+F).  
 
Proof:  See Appendix 1.  
 
To keep the notation simple in what follows, we shall focus on the case of an 
equal number of applications from each group, i.e. δ=.5
8    In that case, (4) can be 
written:   
 
                                                 
7 Note that application processing costs are an essential component of our model:  after all, in the absence 
of processing costs, firms could costlessly duplicate the effects of any advertised job requirement by 
soliciting applications from everyone, then just discarding the applications from the groups that are not 
wanted.  Application processing costs differ from the usual costs assumed in search models, such as a fixed 
cost of opening a vacancy and the opportunity cost of keeping the job vacant; they will also be affected by 
a less familiar set of factors, including the firm’s information-processing technology and the complexity of 
the methods used to evaluate job candidates.   
8 Results for unequal numbers are presented in an earlier version of this paper (Kuhn and Shen, 2009); 
nothing of importance changes.     6
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where N=.5C is the (common) number of applications expected from each group.  
 
We next define z ≡ (μ
M - μ
F)/β as the standardized gap in expected net value 
between the groups.
9  Overall, the firm’s optimal recruiting policy is then described by:  
 
Proposition 1.  The firm’s optimal recruiting policy is to: 
   
Solicit men only if z > z*,  
 
Solicit women only if z < -z* 
 




 1 ) / exp( ln *     cN z  > 0 if  )] 2 ln( , 0 [ /   cN  (“high variance” case), and 
 
z* = 0 if  cN/θβ > ln(2)  (“low variance” case).   
 
When cN/ θβ ≤ ln(2), the firm’s optimal policy is to invite women only when z is 
low, men only when z is high, and to accept applications from both groups for 
intermediate values of  z.  We refer to this as the “high variance” case because it 
corresponds to high levels of variance in idiosyncratic worker quality, i.e. high β; 
however it also corresponds to higher levels of skill, lower levels of hiring costs, and 
smaller expected applicant pools.  When cN/θβ > ln(2) (the “low variance” case), firms 
always restrict their ads:  to men only when z>0 and to women otherwise.   
 
Overall, Proposition 1 shows that the factors influencing a firm’s optimal 
recruiting strategy fall naturally into two categories:  Factors that raise the index z, which 
is the expected productivity, cost and taste advantage of men for this job, raise the 
‘likelihood’ that firms will invite only men to apply, and reduce the likelihood that firms 
will invite only women.
10  As a shorthand, we will refer to these factors as relative 
preferences.  The remaining parameters in the model, c, N, θ, and β, operate only on the 
thresholds, z* and –z*.  We refer to these factors as search-related.  
 
To understand how the search-related factors work, consider first the high-
variance case, where there exist values of z for which it is optimal not to gender-target the 
job ad.  Here, the search-related factors (c, N, θ, and β) either move the thresholds -z* and  
z* closer together, making it more likely that firms will engage in gender restrictions of 
                                                 
9  Since      / 6  , where    is the standard deviation of net value.   
10 We formalize this likelihood in Section 5, where we posit a distribution of expected net values across 
jobs that are offered by employers, and estimate a maximum likelihood model of the incidence of 
advertised gender restrictions across jobs.       7
either type, or farther apart, with the opposite effect.  Specifically, the model predicts that 
increases in β (i.e. greater idiosyncratic variance of applicant productivity), and increases 
in θ (the job’s skill level) reduce the likelihood that firms will advertise gender 
restrictions in either direction.  The intuition is that higher variance raises the option 
value of searching from a larger pool (i.e. raises the chance the best candidate will come 
from the group with the lower mean), and higher skill levels raise the importance to the 
firm of identifying the best candidate.  In contrast, increases in c and N move –z* and z* 
closer together, making advertised gender restrictions more likely.  This is because both c 
and N directly raise the cost of doubling the applicant pool from N to 2N to include both 
men and women.     
 
Turning now to the low-variance case, in this region of the parameter space firms 
will always direct their ads only to the group they prefer. To see how our model 
specializes to Becker’s in this case, consider a labor market with many employers, 
indexed by i, who can hire either men or women for the same task.  All employers in this 
market face the same wages, w
M and w
F, but firms’ relative tastes for hiring men (t
M – t
F) 
and possibly the expected gender productivity gap, q
M - q
F, can vary across firms.  Thus, 
a firm’s baseline gender gap in total net value, v
M - v
F, can be decomposed into the 
following components: 
 












i w w t t q q v v       
 
If, for simplicity, we assume (as Becker does) that men and women are equally 
productive in these jobs, then in Becker’s frictionless world and in our ‘low variance’ 
case, firms where  will hire only men, and firms where 
will hire only women.  The market wage differential ensures that 
enough firms of either type will exist to employ all the men and women.  Our high-
variance case thus generalizes Becker’s analysis to a case where search frictions cause 
some job ads to not be targetted, as is in fact the case for the majority of job ads in China.   
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Since gender restrictions occur in only about one in ten ads in our data, we 
assume in our empirical work that the ‘high variance’ case applies to all employers (i.e. 
that there exists some expected gender value differential, perhaps infinitesimal, for which 
every firm would prefer not to issue a discriminatory ad).  In our empirical work, we will 
use this model to interpret patterns of discriminatory advertising. We also test a key 
prediction of the model: that the incidence of both ‘male-only’ and ‘female-only’ ads 
should decline as the job’s skill level rises.   
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Our data is the universe of unique job advertisements posted on Zhaopin.com, the 
third largest online job board in China, during four observation periods:  May 19 2008 - 
June 22 2008, January 19 2009 - February 22 2009, May 18 2009 - June 21 2009, and   8
January 18 2010 - February 21 2010.
11  Procedures for downloading the data and 
defining variables are discussed in Appendix 2.  Like all samples of job ads, ads on 
Zhaopin.com will not be representative of all jobs in China; they will overrepresent jobs 
in expanding and high-turnover occupations and industries.  In addition, the jobs on 
Zhaopin.com likely require a significantly higher skill level than the median job in Chin
Since we might expect firms in expanding and high-turnover industries to be less 
selective about their employees’ gender, and since we show below that advertised 
discrimination is less common in skilled occupations, it seems likely that our data 
underestimates the overall extent of gender-targetting 
a.  
job advertising in China.  
                                                
 
  Another sampling issue arises from the fact that some of the ads in our data are 
for multiple vacancies.  While we treat the ad as the unit of analysis thoughout this paper, 
we address this issue by controlling for the number of vacancies the ad advertises.
12  A 
related issue is that ads for multiple vacancies can specify up to three occupations.  Since 
the share of vacancies corresponding to the individual occupations is generally unknown 
in these cases, we restrict our sample to ads for a single occupation; this reduces our 
sample by about 20 percent.
13  Finally, we note that, by construction, our data comprise 
the stock of unfilled ads rather the flow of new vacancies.  This implies that long vacancy 
spells are overrepresented in our data, which would affect our estimates if there is 
parameter heterogeneity in the determinants of ad content that is correlated with vacancy 
durations.
14  To address this concern, we replicated our estimates for a subsample of ads 
from near the end of each data collection period that consists, almost certainly, of newly 
posted ads.  The results were very similar.   
 
Descriptive statistics for our data are provided in Table 1.  All told, we study a 
total of 1,057,538 job ads.  Our principal measure of a job’s skill level is the education 
requirement listed by the employer in the ad; by this metric a typical job on Zhaopin is 
quite highly skilled: about 87 percent of ads (1 - 136595/1057538) require at least some 
post-secondary education.
15  Eighty-one percent require some experience, with the modal 
experience requirement between one and three years.  A little more than one in ten ads 
expressed a gender preference; this was evenly split between men and women.
16  As 
suggested by our model, however, employers’ propensity to express a gender preference 
is strongly, and negatively related to the job’s educational requirements:  almost a quarter 
of jobs requiring high school education or less were explicitly ‘gendered’; this fraction 
falls to a little over six percent for jobs requiring a university education.     
 
11 Note that firms frequently re-post the same ad; our sample treats all such renewals as the same ad.  Our 
choice of Zhaopin is largely for the technical reason that its site structure allowed us to easily and 
accurately identify such renewals.   
12 We also estimated some specifications where we weight each ad by the number of vacancies it 
represents; the results are unchanged.     
13 Our results were very similar when we included all ads and classified them according to the first 
occupation listed, or when we allocated ads fractionally, and equally, across all the occupations they listed.  
14 See Bergeron et al. (2008) for a recent discussion of the effects of length-biased sampling.   
15 By far the most common occupation (of the 40 categories used by Zhaopin on its site) is sales, at about 
22 percent of the ads, with IT second at about 13 percent. The top five industries were construction, 
consulting, IT, marketing, and trade.  24 and 17 percent of the ads were for jobs in Beijing and Shanghai 
respectively, but all Chinese provinces are represented in our data.   
16 This includes all intensities of preference, though the most typical employer statements were either 
“female[male] preferred” and “female[male] only”.    9
 
About half of the ads in our sample specified the number of vacancies that were 
available.  Half of these, in turn, were for a single position.  That said, a significant share 
of the ads were for large numbers of job openings.  More than half of the ads were placed 
by privately owned, Chinese firms (this includes privately held companies, publicly-
traded companies and former State-Owned Enterprises where a majority of shares are still 
owned by the state).  Another 36 percent of ads were from employers with some foreign 
connection.  Most of these were Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and joint ventures, 
though a small number of representative offices are also included.  A further seven  
percent of ads were for jobs in State-Owned Enterprises.  We also observed some ads 
from non-profit employers (e.g. in education or health care) or (local, provincial or 
federal) public service; while these are a very small share of the total, our large sample 
size allows us to study them as well.   
 
A different, complementary picture of the frequency of discriminatory job ads in 
China emerges when we organize our data by firms rather than ads.  Overall, 74,202 
distinct firms placed ads on Zhaopin during our sampling period; thus the average 
number of ads per firm was 1,057,538/74,202 = 14.25.  Characteristics of these 74,202 
firms’ hiring policies are summarized in Table 2.  According to Table 3, 19.9 percent of 
the firms in our data placed at least one ad that invited only men to apply; for women this 
number was 26.0 percent.  For obvious reasons, these shares rise with the number of ads 
the firm placed on Zhaopin, and with the number of distinct occupations for which it 
advertised on Zhaopin during our sample period.  Thus, for example, among firms that 
placed more than 50 ads, over 70 percent expressed a gender preference at least once, and 
39 percent placed both male-only and female-only ads during our sample period.   
 
In sum, Tables 1 and 2 illustrate three key features of advertised gender 
discrimination in China.  First, a large share of employers engage in hiring practices that 
would be considered an illegal form of discrimination in the United States.  Although we 
do not address the larger question of whether Chinese or American laws are more 
appropriate, we do discuss some consequences of such legislative differences in the 
conclusion to this paper.  Second, advertised gender preferences vary significantly across 
jobs within the same firm.  Finally, advertised gender preferences in favor of both men 
and women decline markedly as the job’s advertised education requirement rises.  We 
explore all of these, and many other features of discrimination in job ads in more detail in 
the following section.   
 
5. Empirical Determinants of Gender Discrimination in Job Ads 
 
  To bring Section 2’s model of advertised discrimination to the data, let the  
employer’s net relative valuation of men in the position described in ad i be given by  
 
(6)  zi  = xi b + νi      
 
where xi  includes all the observable determinants of firms’ preferences towards men (and 
away from women) for that job, plus a constant term.  According to Proposition 1, an ad 
will then be targetted at men if  νi  >   zi* - xi b, targetted at women if  νi  < - zi* - xi b, 
and will not contain any gender restrictions otherwise.  Suppose further that νi is   10
independently and normally distributed across job ads with cdf F(νi).  The likelihood of 
observing each of the three possible ad types can then be written:   
 
Prob(restrict ad to women) ≡ P
F  =    b xi   * i z F   
 
(7)   Prob(no gender restrictions) ≡ P
C  =      b x b x i i     * * i i z F z F  
 
Prob(restrict ad to men) ≡ P
M  =    b xi   * 1 i z F , 
 
If zi* = z* (a constant for all observations) and F is N(0, σν
2), (7) describes an ordered 
probit model, which can be used to estimate the parameter vector b up to a constant of 
proportionality (σν).  An important feature of our theoretical model, however, is that a 
subset of the ad’s observed characteristics –in particular the indicators of its skill 
requirements, but also any observable correlates of application processing costs, expected 
numbers of applications, and idiosyncratic worker quality—are expected to act on the 
two thresholds in this three-outcome ordered probit in a somewhat unusual way.  
Specifically, high skill requirements are predicted to move the two thresholds apart by 
equal amounts; this is reflected in (7) by the fact that the thresholds equal -z* and  z* 
respectively.     
 
In order to model the dependence of these thresholds on ads’ observable 
characteristics, we therefore assume in addition that: 
 
(8)  z i* = exp(-xid)   
 
which implicitly assumes that any variable that might affect firms’ relative valuation of 
men versus women (zi) can at least potentially affect zi* as well.
17   
 
  Taken together, (7) and (8) plus a distributional assumption for F comprise a 
simple model of our data that can be estimated via maximum likelihood.  This model 
allows all observable characteristics of a job or firm, including the job’s skill 
requirements, to affect the firm’s relative preference for men versus women in that job 
(z), and at the same time to affect the gap between the firm’s two thresholds, i.e. the 
length of the interval of z’s in which the firm chooses not to target its ads.  The latter is 
summarized by the scalar z*.  Importantly, the effects of any given observable on z* are 
identified even if we believe that observable also affects a firm’s ‘tastes towards men’ 
(z).
18  This allows us to test the model’s prediction concerning skill requirements without 
needing to assume, for example, that firms’ tastes towards men are independent of the 
job’s skill level.  It also allows us to identify the effects of observable covariates on the 
firm’s relative preferences for men while adjusting for differences between ads in search-
                                                 
17 Note also that, according to our theoretical model,    1 ) exp( ln *    i i Q z , where i i i i i N c Q   /  ; 
therefore (by re-arranging) the estimated ratio Qi can be recovered from our parameter estimates for each 
ad via the expression    1 ) exp( exp log     d xi i Q .        
18 It is of course possible to estimate the model in the presence of exclusion restrictions, but these are not 
required for identification.  Intuitively, as we show below, this is because we have data on two distinct 
outcomes (P
M and P
F); d is identified by the effects of x on their sum (P
M + P
F ) while b is identified by x’s 
effects on their difference (P
M  - P
F ).    11
related factors that would otherwise contaminate our estimates by affecting the firm’s 
overall preferences to search narrowly versus broadly.   
 
Finally, we note that (8) is formulated such that a positive dk coefficient implies 
that covariate xk reduces z*, thus making discrimination of both types more common.  
This allows us to interpret the b parameters, loosely, as the effects of the covariates on 
firms’ relative preferences towards men (and away from women), and the d parameters  
as firm’s tendencies to gender-target their ads in general (i.e. as the effects of the 
covariates on minus z*).     
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vectors b and d in (7) and (8) 
using the standard normal distribution for F are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
3.  In addition to the variables shown, these estimates also control for the number of 
vacancies advertised, part-time jobs, and period fixed effects.  Net of all the controls, 
column 1 shows that firms’ underlying preferences for men (z) vary in a nonmonotonic 
way with the job’s education requirements, at first falling, then rising.  In contrast, as 
predicted by our model, the estimated effects of the propensity to discriminate in general  
are negative and monotonic, even while controlling for the observable ad characteristics 
in the Table 3 regressions.   
 
According to Table 3, experience requirements have a similar qualitative effect on 
z* as do education requirements: higher experience requirements are associated with 
broader search strategies and less total discrimination.  To the extent that experience 
requirements also indicate a higher overall skill level for the job, this also supports our 
model’s predictions.  Interestingly, however, experience requirements also have a highly 
significant, positive association with firms’ preferences towards men.  In other words, we 
find that Chinese employers act as if men were better suited than women to jobs requiring 
high levels of experience.   
 
Table 3 also shows that employers’ relative preferences towards men, z, are 
higher in bigger firms, state-owned enterprises, and in government jobs, and lower in 
firms with some foreign ownership (all relative to Chinese private sector firms).  Turning 
to firms’ overall propensity to to engage in advertised discrimination, this is lower in 
larger firms and in state-owned enterprises, and especially in foreign-owned firms.  The 
opposite is the case for government jobs in China.  We comment more on possible 
explanations for these patterns later in this section.   
 
Our goal in the remainder of this section is to assess whether the above patterns, 
especially those involving skill requirements, are robust to a much more detailed set of 
controls for observed job characteristics.  Such characteristics include occupation and 
industry fixed effects that would capture unobserved correlates of both skill requirements 
and employers’ gender preferences.  Introducing large numbers of fixed effects is 
however not computationally tractable in maximum likelihood models such as the one in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.  For that reason we next develop a linear approximation 
to our model and illustrate its properties in the remainder of Table 3.   
 
To that end, consider first the effects of an infinitesimal increase in covariate xk on 
the probability that an ad is targetted at men (P
M) or women (P
F) respectively in our   12
model.  Differentiating the corresponding terms in (7), these marginal effects are given 
by:   
 
 *) ( ) exp( / 2  f b d x P k k k
M      xd  
 
  *) ( ) exp( / 1  f b d x P k k k
F      xd , 
 
where ν1* (ν2*) is the critical value of ν below (above) which firms advertise a preference 
for men (women).    
 
Combining these to yield the marginal effect of xk on the probability that a firm 




F)/ ∂xk  =      *) ( *) ( *) ( *) ( ) exp( 1 2 2 1     f f b f f d k k    xd .   
 




F)/ ∂xk  =  ) exp( xd  m dk ,  
 
while a parallel argument for (P
M +P
F) yields:   
(11)  ∂(P
M -P
F)/ ∂xk  =  bkm. 
In other words, up to a factor of proportionality, the parameter dk is simply equal 
to xk’s marginal effect on the probability that a firm discriminates in some direction in its 
ad.  This is true regardless of xk’s effects on the firm’s preference towards men, z, 
because any such effects subtract out of (9).  Similarly, bk is identified by the marginal 
effect of xk on the difference between the probabilities, P
M -P
F.  Further, while (10) and 
(11) are true for all observations and data sets only when f(νi) is uniform, for any 
symmetric f(νi) they are satisfied whenever the predicted levels of P
M and P
F are equal.  
As already noted, this is essentially the case for an observation with mean characteristics 
( x  x ) in our data.  Thus, especially given our large sample size, any consistent estimate 
of the marginal effect ∂(P
M +P
F)/ ∂xk  should yield (up to a constant) a relatively accurate 
estimate of dk.  By the same token, ∂(P
M -P
F)/ ∂xk  should provide a good estimate of bk. 
The simplest approach is just to run OLS regressions of the sum (difference) of P
M and P
F 
on observables.   
 
The remaining columns of Table 3 examine the accuracy of this approximation in 
our data, by comparing the marginal effects estimated by ML versus OLS approaches.  
Columns (3) and (4) computed the estimated marginal effects ∂(P
M +P
F)/ ∂xk  and ∂(P
M -
P
F)/ ∂xk  from our ML estimates of b and d for an ad with mean characteristics ( x x  ).  
Columns (5) and (6) compute the same marginal effects from a linear probability model 
regression.  Clearly, these estimated marginal effects (and their standard errors) are very 
similar.  In the remainder of the paper we will therefore estimate the determinants of z* 




F on x respectively.     
   13





F) is a (0,1) indicator variable for whether the ad is targetted at men 
(women).
19  As argued, up to a constant, coefficients in these regressions are estimates of 
each variable’s effects on  –z*, with positive coefficients moving the thresholds  –z* and  
z* closer together, thus reducing the frequency of advertised discrimination in both 
directions.  Column 1 simply adds province fixed effects to the regression reported in 
column (8) of Table 3; the results change very little.  Moving across the columns, we then 
add occupation and industry fixed effects(column 2), fixed effects for occupation* 
industry interactions (column 3), for occupation*industry*province interactions (column 
4); for individual firms and occupations (column 5), and finally in column 6 for a full set 
of 260,228 firm*occupation interactions.  As already noted, a key motivation for adding 
these fixed effects is to ascertain whether firms’ tendency to refrain from gender 
discrimination when jobs require a higher skill level is associated with the skill 
requirement itself, rather than other features of the type of work that is required, the 
industry, or even the specific firm doing the hiring.   
 
While the magnitudes of the estimated effects vary somewhat across 
specifications, Table 4 clearly shows that the tendency to refrain from gender 
discrimination in general as skill requirements rise is a highly robust feature of our data.  
Even when we compare the same firm hiring for the same occupation at different times 
(i.e in the column 6 specification), that firm is less likely to stipulate a gender preference 
when the job’s required skill level is high than when it is lower.  The effects also remain 
large in magnitude:  raising education requirements from high school or less to some 
postsecondary reduces the probability that a firm will engage in some form of gender 
discrimination by 6 percentage points, relative to a mean of about 10 percentage points.   
 
As in columns (3) and (5) of Table 3, all the columns of Table 4 show that, like 
education requirements, higher experience requirements strongly reduce gender-
targetting in job ads (though the effect is not monotonic at the highest experience levels 
in all specifications).  Once again, these estimated effects are consistent with our 
predictions regarding skill requirements and are large in magnitude:  raising experience 
requirements from less than one year to 3-5 years reduces the probability that a firm will 
engage in some form of gender discrimination by about 3 percentage points in all 
specifications.   
 
  While it is not possible to estimate the effects of firm characteristics in the 
presence of firm fixed effects, columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 show that the estimated effects 
of firm size and type on advertised discrimination are also highly robust to specification.  
For example, larger firms are less likely to restrict their job ads to a particular gender, but 
the effect is small in magnitude.  Foreign ownership reduces the likelihood that firms will 
engage in some form of advertised gender discrimination by about 3 percentage points in 
all specifications.  Since this effect is robust to industry, occupation and other controls, it 
seems likely to reflect a pure effect of those international connections, such as 
international differences in corporate culture, or the influence of laws or public opinion in 
the home country on a firm’s operations in China.  The only other employer type that 
                                                 
19 Coefficients of the ‘underlying’ regressions for P
M and  P
F separately can be computed by simple 
addition or subtraction of the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5.  Tables (including standard errors) are also 
available from the authors.      14
differs significantly from the base category (Chinese private sector firms) is the public 
sector, which is much more likely to express a gender preference.  These large effects 
however also come with large standard errors, since our sample of public sector ads is 
very small.   
 
Table 5 presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is P
M - 
P
F.  As argued above, up to a scale factor these coefficients give the effect of observable 
characteristics on an employer’s net relative valuation of men (relative to women) for the 
job on offer (z).  Importantly, under the assumptions of our model, these estimates are 
purged of the effects of observables on the propensity to search broadly (without 
restrictions) or narrowly that would contaminate other estimates, especially if the same 
observables affect search-related factors (such as the number of expected applications 
and application processing costs) as affect employers’ relative valuations.   
 
  In sharp contrast to Table 5, a job’s education requirements have mostly weak and 
insignificant effects on whether employers prefer men versus women to fill it.  Thus, the 
strong effects of education on the tendency to discriminate is almost entirely attributable 
to its effects on thresholds, which were predicted by our model.  In an important sense, 
then, Chinese employers are not using discriminatory job ads to ‘keep women out of’ 
jobs requiring high levels of education.  The same, however cannot be said about 
experience:  employers are much more likely to prefer men to women in jobs with higher 
experience requirements than in other jobs.
20  Large employers also appear to have 
greater preferences in the direction of men. 
 
  Table 5 also shows a negative effect of foreign ownership on firms’ preferences 
towards men, though this effect (of less than a percentage point) is much smaller than 
their negative effect on the propensity to discriminate in general.  SOEs and 
governments, on the other hand, seem to have a stronger preference in favor of men than 
other firms (the government effect very large but with a correspondingly large standard 
error).  Given that these two employer types face less product-market competition than 
others in our sample, this finding is consistent with the prediction of taste-based 
discrimination models, that employers will be more able to indulge disriminatory tastes 
when competition is low.
21   
 
  It may also be of interest to examine the estimated occupation fixed effects in 
Tables 4 and 5 for clues regarding when firms want men versus women in a job.  These 
fixed effects, shown in Figure 1, are derived from  regressions identical to column 2 in 
Tables 4 and 5 with one exception:  education was removed from the list of controls, in 
order to illustrate its effects in the Figure itself.  Occupations in the Figure are divided 
                                                 
20 It may be interesting to note that these effects would be masked in a simple regression of P
M on 
experience requirements:  those coefficients are essentially zero in the column 6 specification because the 
effect of experience on preferences is totally masked by the negative effect of experience on thresholds. 
21 See Black and Strachan (2001) and Black and Brainerd (2004) for other recent evidence of the effects of 
product market competition on gender discrimination.  Our findings regarding gender, SOEs and the public 
sector are consistent with Zhang, Han, Liu and Zhao (2008), who find that the share of the unadjusted 
gender wage gap that is not accounted for by observable productivity-related characteristics in China is 
smaller in market-oriented activities than state-owned ones.   For other recent studies of gender differentials 
in China, see Gustafsson and Li (2000) and Liu, Meng and Zhang  (2000).   
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into two groups, based on our a priori impression of whether they are likely to involve a 
considerable amount of customer contact.  The six customer-contact occupations, 
indicated by triangles, are sales, customer service, hospitality/tourism/ 
entertainment (“tourism”),  editing/media/film/news (“media”), retail, and “healthcare/ 
beauty/fitness” (“health”).  Symbol sizes are proportional to the inverse of the variance of 
the estimated fixed effect, and a regression line (estimated with these weights) and the 
95% confidence band is shown.  
 
Part (a) of Figure 1 shows the estimated fixed effects on –z* for the 40 
occupations in our data from the Table 4 regressions.  As predicted by our model (and as 
was apparent from the regressions), ads for the least-skilled occupational group (labor 
and domestic service) are almost 30 percentage points more likely to stipulate a preferred 
gender than in the reference occupation (sales).  Aside from public service, which is 
based on a very small sample, the two most positive outliers in the tendency to gender-
target ads are administration and tourism occupations.   
 
Part (b) of Figure 1 shows the estimated fixed effects from the Table 5 regressions 
for firms’ relative preferences toward men (z).  Here, the strong negative association in 
part (a) is replaced by essentially a zero overall relation to education.  Large positive 
outliers in the employers’ preferences towards men are occupations involving manual 
labor, technical occupations, and communications/logistics; large negative outliers 
(indicating a preference for women that cannot be accounted for by observable features 
of the firm, industry, or ad) are tourism, retail, health occupations, and administration.  
Three of these four are customer-contact occupations; we will shed additional light on 
why employers prefer women in these jobs in the following Section.   
 
  Next, we note that the R
2s in Tables 4 and 5 provide additional information on the 
structure of the cross-sectional variation in employers’ gender preferences (z) and search-
related factors (-z*).  Notably, less than 10 percent of the variation in either of these 
factors is explainable by a full set of occupation fixed effects, or even by a full set of over 
1600 occupation*industry interactions.  Firm fixed effects add a considerable amount of 
explanatory power, raising R
2  to .28 and .37 respectively.  We note, however, that 
removing occupation effects from the model with firm effects (not shown) reduces R
2 
imperceptibly:  thus, almost none of the between-firm differences in gender preferences 
can be explained by the fact that firms hire different mixes of occupations.  On the other 
hand, R
2 for both  z and -z* rise to about two thirds with a full set of occupation*firm 
interactions.  This provides further support for the notion that firms’ gender preferences 
are job-specific, in the sense that they vary across occupations within firms, and that 
different firms tend to have different gender preferences for the same occupations.  
Finally, we note that the remaining one third of the variation in employers’ gender 
preferences (and of search-related factors as well) is within firm*occupation cells.  This 
suggests that firms engage in gender-job typing, or even gender segregation, at the level 
of highly detailed job descriptions, as documented, for example by Bielby and Baron 
(1984).   
 
Finally, as outlined in Appendix 3, we calculated the share of total (observed and 
unobserved) variation in firms’ advertised preferences for men that was attributable to 
variation in z versus -z*.  We did the same for women.  In both cases, for all regression   16
specifications reported in Tables 4 and 5 we found that about half of both the observed 
and unobserved variation was attributable to z versus -z*, with a small covariance term.  
In other words, about half the cross-sectional variation in advertised discrimination in 
favor of, say, men, is not associated with differences in firms’ net preferences for men 
over women as employees (whether related to tastes, expected productivity differences, 
or wage differences).  Instead this variation is associated with search-related factors that 
make some firms reluctant to restrict their applicant pools and others to be happy to do 
so.  This underscores the importance of accounting for search-related factors when 
attempting to infer employers’ gender preferences from data on discriminatory job ads.   
 
6.  Supporting Evidence 
 
  In this section we present two additional types of evidence to further probe our 
hypothesis that high job skill requirements reduce firms’ incentives to explicitly 
discriminate in the recruiting process, and that they do so because higher skill demands 
raise the option value of searching from a larger pool of candidates.  First, we examine 
firms’ use of demographic signals other than gender; specifically age, beauty and height.  
If our hypothesis about why education reduces gender-targetting in ads is correct, then 
firms’ use of these other screens should also decline with job skill levels.  Second, we 
examine the effects of a third indicator (in addition to education and experience 
requirements) of job skill levels:  the advertised wage.  While this indicator has both 
advantages and disadvantages relative to the measures use so far –which we discuss in 
detail below—we shall see that it also dramatically confirms our main hypothesis.   
 
a) Other forms of advertised “discrimination”:  
 
  Table 6 presents descriptive statistics on advertised requirements for some other 
ascriptive demographic characteristics which, like gender, are typically prohibited (or at 
least widely disapproved of) in U.S. job ads:  age, beauty and height.
22  According to 
Table 6, slightly less than one in four ads on Zhaopin.com expressed an age preference;  
perhaps surprisingly, minimum age requirements were almost as common as maxima.  
Indeed, 12.8 percent of ads specified both a minimum and a maximum age, and fewer 
than one percent of advertised minima were below 18.  That said, firms seem overall to 
be seeking younger workers: the mean minimum and maximum ages were about 25 and 
36 respectively, and fewer than 5 percent of the maximum ages were over 48.    
 
Unlike gender and age requirements, which can go in both ‘directions’ (excluding 
either men or women, ruling out both the too-old and the too-young), we could find no 
ads in our sample of over a million that requested short or unattractive applicants.  All 
together, 7.7 percent of ads requested that the applicant be physically attractive 
(“xingxiang”). Given the relative rarity of gender restrictions, a large majority of the 
requests for beauty in our sample were in ads that did not express a gender preference.  
Among ads that did express a gender preference, however, beauty was much more valued 
among women than men:  fully one out of every three ads targeted at female applicants 
required the applicant to be physically attractive, compared to 6.7 percent for ads targeted 
                                                 
22  We also searched for evidence of ethnic or racial discrimination in our sample of ads.  Only 56 ads in 
our sample explicitly requested that the applicant be Han (China’s dominant ethnic group).  Ads requesting 
minority ethnicities were actually more common.        17
at men.  This contrasts starkly with some U.S. studies (e.g. Hamermesh and Biddle 1994), 
which did not find that the labor market returns to beauty were highly ‘gendered’.  
 
At 2.6 percent of job ads, height requirements are the least common of the ‘US-
prohibited’ job requirements on which we have data.  Moreover, minimum height 
requirements take several distinct forms on Zhaopin.com.  Most commonly (in 1.1 
percent of ads overall), these requirements appeared in ads directed at women, and 
stipulated a minimum height (of 162.1 cm on average) for (presumably female) 
applicants.  In contrast, 0.4 percent of ads overall had a height requirement (of 167.1 cm 
on average) and were directed specifically at men.  0.9 percent of ads listed a single 
height requirement (of 165.2 cm) without mentioning gender, while a small but 
interesting share (0.2  percent) listed two gender-specific height requirements (which 
averaged 171.0 cm for men and 162.2 cm for women).  Since it is unlikely that this type 
of height requirement is related to a specific job task, we speculate that firms posting 
such ads use them either as signals of health or cognitive ability (as argued by Case and 
Paxson 2008), or because being tall for one’s gender is valued directly, perhaps by a 
firm’s customers.  Finally, we note that, like beauty, height requirements are highly 
gendered in China: over one fifth of all job ads directed at women specified a minimum 
height, compared to only 6.7 percent of job ads directed at men.  We provide additional 
evidence on firm’s motivations for these requirements in our analysis of occupation fixed 
effects below.   
 
Turning to our main hypothesis, Table 6, like Table 1, shows a strong negative 
association between a job’s skill requirements and its tendency to have age, beauty and 
height requirements.  Among jobs requiring high school education or less, 40, 15 and 9 
percent had an age, beauty or height requirement; for jobs requiring university education 
these numbers fall to 17, 4 and 1 percent respectively.  Table 7 confirms the robustness of 
this pattern by showing linear probability model regression results with the same 
specifications as columns (4) and (6) of Tables 4 and 5.  Because age restrictions, like 
gender restrictions are ‘bilateral’ in our data, columns (1)-(4) adopt a similar strategy of 
separately identifying firms’ preferences in the direction of older workers (z) (or 
alternatively, their ‘ideal’ employee age for that job) from their propensity to impose age 
restrictions in general (-z*).  The latter effects come from regressions in which the 
dependent variable equals one if the ad had either a minimum or minimum age (or both).  
The regression underlying the former uses the difference between two dummies (for the 
presence of a minimum and maximum age respectively) as the dependent variable.   
Since ads for beauty and height only go in one direction, we simply present linear 
probability models for the presence of these restrictions; z and -z* cannot be separately 
identified here and it is important to take note of this in interpreting the estimates.   
 
Table 7 clearly shows that, even in the presence of highly detailed controls, firms’ 
propensity to age-target ads (in any way) declines sharply with jobs’ education 
requirements: in the most saturated regression specification (column 4) jobs requiring 
some postsecondary education (a university degree) are 8 (11) percentage points less 
likely to specify an age requirement of any kind. Firms’ relative valuation of older 
workers also seems to rise with education requirements, but the effect is much smaller in 
magnitude and not consistently statistically significant.  For beauty and height it is not 
possible to separate z and z* factors, but the strong negative effect of job skill   18
requirements on firms’ propensities to specify these requirements is again consistent with 
a strong negative effect on -z* combined with weaker (or zero) effects on z.   
 
Turning to the other covariates in Table 7, consistent with our findings for gender 
we also find that firms with some foreign ownership are much less (8 percentage points) 
likely to advertise any age restrictions for their jobs, and less likely to request either 
beauty or a minimum height.  Once again, this suggests an effect of corporate culture, or 
of antidiscrimination laws or sentiments in other countries.  We also find that non-profit 
employers and state-owned enterprises have strong preferences for younger workers, 
while foreign-owned firms have a slightly greater preference for older workers than 
Chinese private-sector firms.   
 
Finally, Figure 2 illustrates the occupation fixed effects associated with the Table 
7 regressions in the same way as Figure 1 did for Tables 4 and 5.  Part (a) shows the 
strong negative relationship between education requirements and the use of age 
restrictions in ads, while part (b) general shows a positive relation between education 
requirements and the firm’s ‘ideal’ employee age for the job.  In part since education 
itself takes time to acquire, this relationship does not seem surprising.  Neither figure 
contains obvious outliers except perhaps a disproportionate preference for young 
researchers and old public servants, and a greater tendency to specify a desired age in ads 
for managerial jobs.   
 
Parts (c) and (d) of Figure 2 show that advertised beauty and height requirements 
both become less common as jobs’ skill requirements rise, but of particular interest here 
are some dramatic outliers.  Specifically, retail, tourism, administration and health 
occupations all have much higher beauty requirements than one would predict based on 
ads’ other observable characteristics, including education requirements.  Interestingly, 
these same four occupations also show above-average employer requests for height, and 
(recalling Figure 1(b)) strong relative preferences towards women.  Further, three of the 
four are customer contact occupations.  When we looked further into the exception –
administration—we found that the predominant type of job advertised in this category 
was secretarial.
23  Thus, an examination of occupational patterns suggests some support 
for taste discrimination in our data, at least to the extent that customers, plus persons who 
hire secretaries, prefer to interact with tall, attractive women.  Height requirements are 
however also disproportionately used in ads for unskilled workers, where it is easier to 
imagine that they are associated with physical job requirements.   
 
b) Advertised wages as a skill indicator:  
 
While gender or racial wage gaps are the focus of most studies of  labor market 
discrimination, we have so far presented no data on wages.  In part, this decision is data-
driven, since only about 16.5 percent of the ads in our sample contain usable information 
about offered wages.
24  Thus, any analysis of wage effects must be conditional on the 
                                                 
23 Confirming a strong employer preference for women in these positions, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004)  were forced to stop sending male resumes in response to administrative job ads due to extremely 
low callback rates.   
24 On Zhaopin.com, firms typically indicate wages by entering a minimum and maximum amount into 
fields on a form.  Overall, only 31.5% of ads contained any information in these fields whatsoever; an   19
decision to advertise the wage, a decision we know little about.
25  In part, however, this 
choice is also due to a difference in goals between our paper and papers that focus on 
wage gaps, such as Charles and Guryan (2008) and a large number of regression-based 
studies of wage gaps.  While both our model and Charles-Guryan’s treat individual firms 
as wage takers, their main goal is to explain why wage  gaps (in their case on the basis of 
race) are larger in some labor markets than others.
26  Ours, in contrast, is to look within 
markets, and to understand which firms decide to advertise their jobs for men, which for 
women, and which will impose no gender restrictions in their ads.  The rewards to this 
change in focus are new insights about the micro-level determinants of employers’ 
preferences regarding employees’ demographic attributes.     
 
This said, as equation (6) of our model makes very clear, it remains true that the 
advertising decisions made by a wage-taking firm in our model depend on the wages it 
faces, and that it is therefore desirable to control for these wages in our empirical work, at 
least if we wish to interpret our b coefficients as reflective of firms’ tastes and 
productivity expectations.  To address this issue, we note two important features of how 
wages are predicted to affect firms’ advertising decisions in our model.  First, equation 
(6) indicates that an exogenous increase in the gender wage gap (w
M - w
F) reduces z, and 
thus should raise the share of ads requesting women, and reduce the share requesting 
men.  Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to generate reliable job-specific measures 
of the gender wage gap (w
M - w
F).
27  Therefore we rely on our controls, especially the 
occupation, industry and region effects and their interactions to capture market-level 
variation in the relative cost of male and female labor facing employers.  This seems 
reasonable, in part, because –following Becker’s seminal intuition-- men and women are 
mobile across jobs; one would therefore not expect the gender-wage gap to vary a great 
deal between jobs, at least within an industry*occupation*region cell in our data.   
 
Second, (6) also predicts that equal increases in both w
M and w
F should have no 
effect on advertised discrimination.  Thus, if differences in the overall level of the offered 
wage across the jobs in our sample truly represent differences in the price firms must pay 
per efficiency unit of labor, our model predicts no association between wages and the 
incidence of discrimination in job advertising.  Another possibility, however, is that 
higher wages largely indicate the presence of higher job skill requirements (i.e. the need 
for more labor efficiency units) that are not captured by the observables in our model.  In 
this case, our model predicts that higher-wage jobs should be less likely to impose gender 
                                                                                                                                                 
additional 14 percent selected both the lowest minimum and highest maximum allowed (1000 and 
50,000 yuan/month respectively) allowed on the web form.  An additional one percent specified a wage 
range in excess of 20,000 yuan.  All together, this leaves us with only about 16.5 percent of ads that had 
reasonably informative wage data.  Among these ads, the mean midpoint of the advertised wage range was 
4279 yuan/month. 
25 In fact, we plan to study this decision in a separate paper, using partially-directed search models such as 
Menzio (2007) as a source of hypotheses and analytical framework.   
26 In their case, a labor market is defined as a state; we are able to implement much more narrow 
definitions, such as occupation*industry*province cells.   
27 Each individual ad, of course, only gives wage information for one gender at most; the wage for the 
counterfactual gender would thus need to be imputed.  While one could imagine doing this at, say, the 
occupation level, note that, for example, only 1/10 of ads refer to a specific gender, and only about 16.5 
percent of ads have wage information.  Thus we would be computing a wage gap for the entire occupation 
(or any other observable category) based on only 1.65 percent of the ads in that category.  This strikes us as 
highly questionable, and we have not attempted it.     20
requirements in either direction.  Since, once again, we expect labor market competition 
to roughly equalize the market price of a given number of efficiency units of labor across 
jobs, we consider this scenario much more likely, especially in the presence of detailed 
controls for occupation, region, industry, and even firm fixed effects.  Since we have 
offered wage level information for 16.5% of the ads in our sample, we test this prediction 
in Table 8.   
 
Table 8 presents coefficients on a job’s advertised wage when it is added to the 
regressions for gender in columns (4) and (6) of Tables 4 and 5, and to the equivalent 
regressions for age, beauty and height in Table 7.  Taken together, the results are strongly 
supportive of the notion that that higher skill requirements, as measured by higher offered 
wages, lead to reductions in firms’ tendencies to gender-target ads (column 2), and to 
specify either beauty or height requirements in the ad (columns 5 and 6).  We do not 
detect a robust effect of wages on firms’ tendencies to age-target job ads, or on firms’ 
preferences for older versus younger workers.  According to columns (1)-(3), we also 
find that firms’ net preferences towards men for a job are essentially unrelated to the 
job’s overall wage level.  While firms likely have many reasons, both socially acceptable 
and not, for gender-discriminating in their ads, this finding suggests that ‘keeping women 
out of high-paid jobs’ is not a good overall description of firms’ motivations for gender 




  In a legal environment where firms are allowed to engage in explicit gender 
discrimination when advertising their jobs, when will they choose to do so?   Our data 
show that firms in such an environment will use the option to discriminate much more 
often when hiring for positions requiring lower levels of skill, whether skill is measured 
by education requirements, experience requirements, or the offered wage.  This pattern 
holds both for discrimination against women and for discrimination against men.  We see 
this potent role of skill demands as a deterrent to discrimination as complementary to the 
role of product market competition as emphasized by Becker (1957), and suspect that 
rising skill demands may play an important role in explaining why nations tend to 
abandon explicit discrimination as they develop economically.   
  
  What underlying economic processes might explain this robust effect of skill 
demands?  In this paper, we present a simple model of employer search from two 
populations.  According to the model, regardless of whether firms prefer men or women 
for the job they are advertising, firms should be less likely to restrict their search to their 
preferred gender as the job’s skill requirements rise.  The intuition is straightforward:  as 
skill requirements rise, it becomes increasingly important for firms to identify the best 
individual candidate for the job.  Explicitly ‘disinviting’ an entire group of candidates 
from submitting an application makes less sense in these situations.   
 
Another useful feature of our model is that it allows us to separately identify the 
effects of observable ad and firm characteristics on ‘search related’ factors –which reduce 
advertised discrimination against both men and women--, and employers’ net preferences 
towards men (and away from women) for a particular job.  Since search-related factors 
account for almost half of the cross-job variation in advertised discrimination, it is   21
important to account for them when attempting to make inferences about firms’ gender 
preferences.  Using the framework of our model, we find that employers’ underlying 
preferences for men versus women in a job are unrelated to the job’s education and wage 
level, but increase with the job’s required level of experience.  Large firms, and state-
owned enterprises also tend to disproportionately prefer men over women, a pattern that 
is consistent with the hypothesis that lower product market competition facilitates 
discrimination based on employers’ preferences in favor of men.   
 
Foreign ownership, on the other hand, corresponds with a preference by firms 
towards women in our data; this is accompanied by a strong disinclination by firms with 
some foreign ownership to gender-target their job ads in general and to use other 
demographic signals such as age, beauty and height in those ads.  Overall, this pattern 
suggests a role for corporate culture, or for the influence of other countries’ laws or 
public opinion on firms’ hiring policies in China.  We also find large, unexplained 
employer preferences for tall, attractive women in retail, tourism,  health/beauty/fitness, 
and secretarial jobs, suggesting a role for customer and co-worker (or supervisor) tastes.  
 
Finally, an important feature of our data is that employers’ estimated gender 
preferences vary widely across jobs within firms.  Indeed, the broad statistical portrait 
that emerges from our data is one where gender-targetted ads are primarily used to 
allocate some of each firm’s unskilled jobs to men, and others to women.  Further, since 
these occupational gender patterns differ substantially across firms, their explanations 
may need to consider factors beyond the nature of the job itself.  One such possibility is 
the existence of productivity gains (or wage savings) associated purely with gender 
homogeneity in a detailed job title.  Whether due to a signal it might send about changes 
in job skill requirements (Goldin 2006) or simple employee discrimination, departures 
from complete gender segregation at these detailed levels might entail costs that are 
sufficient to motivate explicit gender-targetting by firms of the type we document here.   
This suggests that future research into the causes of gender differentials, especially in 
emerging-country labor markets such as China’s, might do well to focus on the nature of, 
explanations for, and consequences of within-firm gender segregation.   
 
Should China and other developing nations follow the U.S.’s example and ban the 
mention of sex, age, and perhaps other ascriptive characteristics in job ads?  While such 
normative questions are beyond the scope of this paper, we note on the one hand that 
allowing explicit discrimination in job ads does make it easier for employers to engage in 
taste-based discrimination.  On the other hand, we note that a much higher share of U.S. 
than Chinese workers is employed in highly skilled jobs, where both our model and data 
indicate that advertised discrimination is less useful to employers.  Also, our results 
suggest that three ongoing developments –upskilling of the Chinese labor force, 
expansion of the share of Chinese firms that face meaningful product market competition, 
and an increasing presence in China of firms with some foreign ownership—may have 
powerful effects in reducing the incidence of discriminatory job ads even in the absence 
of policy interventions.  
    22
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Appendix 1:  Proofs 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
 
We begin by normalizing the net value of an applicant, defining uj ≡ Uj/β = v
G/β + ej, where ej = 
εj/β follows a “standard” extreme value distribution with Var(ej) = π
2/6 and E(ej) = γ,  j indexes 
applicants, and indexes groups. This normalization does not affect the firm’s optimal 
selection of a worker –the draw of ej that maximizes u corresponds to the draw of εj that maximizes U-- 
and the maximized value of U can be calculated as βu*, where u* is the maximized value of u.  Further, 
this normalization expresses the problem in a standard multinomial logit format, which allows us to 
draw on some results from that literature.   
) , ( F M G
 
Among these, it is well known that the expected value of the maximum of v
G/β + ej  when ej is 
independently drawn N  times from a  “standard” extreme value distribution is v
G/β + γ + log(N).
28  
Multiplying through by β the expected maximum of U when the firm samples from either the M or F 
pool separately is 
 
(A1)     U
G* = v
G + βγ + βlog(G),          
 
which proves part (a) of the Lemma.         
 
 
Turning back to standardized net values, the expected value of the highest uj  in the “combined” 
sample, u





G* is the expected value of the best overall worker 
given the best overall worker is from group G, and q
M is the probability that the best overall worker 
turns out to be an M.  Again using results from the MNL literature, we know that u
M* = v
M/β  + γ – 
log(p
M ), where:   











    
 
is the probability that an individual type-M applicant turns out to be the best in the entire, combined 
pool.  Similarly, we have u
F* = v
F/β  + γ – log(p
F ), where: 
   











 .   
 
Finally, the probability that the firm’s preferred applicant from this combined pool is drawn from the 
M’s is just: 
 











 .   
 
Note that, as the variance of individual productivity (β) falls towards zero, the probability that the best 
overall worker will be from the group with the higher net value (v) approaches one; conversely as β 
approaches infinity, q
M approaches the share of M’s in the population, i.e. M/(M+F).   
                                                 
28 See Arcidiacono and Miller (2008, p. 8) for a general proof.       25
Combining all the necessary expressions and simplifying, the expected standardized value of the 
best worker from the combined pool can be written as: 
 
u
C*  =  γ +  log [ Mexp(v
M/ β) + Fexp(v
F/ β) ] .   
 
Letting δ = M/(M+F) ≡ M/C be the fraction of M’s in the combined pool, this becomes: 
 
  u
C*  =  γ +  log [ δ exp(v
M/ β ) + (1-δ )exp(v
F/ β ) ] + log C .  
 
Multiplying through by β, the corresponding maximized unstandardized value is therefore:  
 
  U
C*  =  γ β + β log [ δ exp(v
M/ β ) + (1-δ )exp(v
F/ β ) ] + β log C .  
 
Expressing this in terms of the means of the unstandardized distributions, µ
 G  ≡ v
G  + βγ, yields after 
some algebra:   
 
(A2)  C U
F M
























 ,  
 
which proves part (b).     
 
 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2:  
 
 
Consider first the difference in the firm’s objective function (“profits”) between recruiting 
strategy M (invite men only) and C (invite all).  Expected profits from inviting only men to apply are 




M* - cN  = μ
M  + βlog(N) – cN. 
 




C* - 2cN  =   N
M F
M log (exp 1 log 

 












   - 2cN. 
 
 Subtracting and simplifying yields:  
 
(A3)   Π
M -  Π
C  =    cN z     exp 1 log  ≡ R
M(z, β) + cN 
 






  is the 
standardized expected net value advantage of group M.    
 
By symmetry,  
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(A4)   Π
F -  Π
C  =    cN z    exp 1 log    =  R
M(-z, β) + cN   ≡   R
F(z, β) + cN 
 
Inspection of (A3) and (A4) shows that R
M(z, β) is always negative and increasing in z. R
M(-z, β) is thus 
also always negative and decreasing in z.  Further, these two functions intersect when z = 0, at the level 
2 log   , as shown in Figure A1 below.   
 
When –cN >  2 log   , as is the case when cN=.4 in Figure A1, it follows from (A4) and (A5) that firms 
prefer to advertise only to men when z > z*, to advertise only to women when z<-z*, and not to restrict 
their ads when -z*<z< z*.  When –cN <  2 log   , as is the case when cN=1 in Figure A1, the combined 
search strategy is never preferred to both of the restricted strategies, so the firm restricts to men when 




Figure A1:  Gains and Costs to Restricted Searches, β=1 
 
 
The critical values, z* and –z*, can be found by setting A3 or A4 equal to zero, yielding: 
 
(A5)    1 ) / exp( log *     cN z  
  
This completes the proof for a job with standard skill requirements.  To generalize the analysis to 
any job, recall that by assumption skill requirements are represented by a constant, θ, that multiplies all 
realizations of Uj .  Thus, changes in θ  multiply both the means (µ
 M and µ
 F) and standard 
deviation ) 6 / (    of the applicants’ net values (Uj) by the same constant, leaving the standardized 
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z
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cN=1 
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change in firms’ decision rules involves the threshold, z*, which becomes, for a job with skill 
requirement θ :     1 ) / exp( log *      cN z
        




Appendix 2: Data 
 
As noted, our overall sample consists of all job ads which appeared on Zhaopin.com between 
during four observation periods:  May 19 2008 - June 22 2008, January 19 2009 - February 22 2009, 
May 18 2009 - June 21 2009, and January 18 2010 - February 21 2010.  At the end of each day, our 
program automatically searches for job ads that were posted on Zhaopin that day. The program starts at 
11:30pm sharp each day for consistency.  On the first day of data collection, all ads that were posted that 
day were kept.  On subsequent days, all ads posted that day are compared with the master list of 
previously-posted jobs; since many such jobs are just renewals that are re-posted (employers can re-post 
and existing ad; this entails a small marginal financial cost but does require action on the employer’s 
part), we do not download these refreshed jobs but maintain a count of the number of renewals that 
occur during this time period.  A similar procedure was applied to the list of firms. As a result, our data 
have information on every job that was posted or renewed during this time period, linked to information 
about the firm posting the job.  All of our regression analysis is restricted to the sample of jobs for which 
we have matching firm information.  The matching rate varies somewhat across specifications but was 
about 80%.     
 
Age, gender and other job requirements were extracted from each job’s html file.  For example, 
in the case of gender, we look for “nue”(female) and “nan”(male) characters in the job description 
section of the file. We then constructed a match table summarizing about 1468 ways for a job ad to 
mention “nue”(female) and “nan”(male). After that, we use a program and this match table to derive the 
gender discrimination variable automatically. We consider our table quite exhaustive. In addition, we 
also visually check all the job ads that mentioned gender in a way that did not match these tables.  Only 
about 100 jobs out of our entire sample fell into this category.  For age variables, we search for “sui” 
(year of age); our approach could therefore miss jobs that ask for age only using numbers “25-35”.  
Therefore, the variables that we use here should be interpreted as having very explicit requirements for 
gender, age and other characteristics.  
 
Occupation and industry categories are those supplied by Zhaopin.com (firms choose from a list 
on the website when submitting their ad).  Note that our occupation and industry dummy variables are 
not mutually exclusive, as  firms are allowed to check multiple categories.  As noted in the paper, we 
handle this in the results reported here by restricting attention to ads for a single occupation.  The 
analysis sample for the current paper also excludes the approximately 20 percent of ads that did not 
specify what education level was required (inspection of these ads showed that these were not 
necessarily unskilled jobs).     
                                          
29 Since for given μ
M - μ
F , z depends by definition on β, Proposition 1 and 2’s predictions for the effects of the idiosyncratic 
variance parameter, β, must be interpreted as conditional on a given z, i.e. conditional on a given standardized gap in 
expected values.   In consequence the effects of β are, in fact, identical to the effects of rescaling workers’ value by θ.  
However, it is easy to show that the effects of an increase in β conditional on a given absolute gap in expected values, i.e. a 
given μ
M - μ
F, is qualitatively the same but stronger in magnitude.  To see this, note that for given μ
M - μ
F, an increase in β 
‘shrinks’ all the z’s towards the origin.  This effect reinforces the effects of β on the thresholds (z*’s),  thus reinforcing the 
decline in the ‘probability’ that  firms will adopt gender restrictions of either kind.     28
Appendix 3: Variance Decomposition 
 
In this exercise, we decompose the cross-sectional variation in advertised preferences for men 
(P
M) and in advertised preferences for women (P
F) in a linear probability model into three components:  
 
i) Variation in firms’ relative preference for men versus women in the job:  productivity differences, 
tastes and wage differences. (associated with parameter vector b below) 
 
ii) Variation across jobs and firms in search-related factors: expected number of applicants, application 
processing costs, and variance in match quality? (associated with parameter vector d below) 
 
iii) The covariance between the above.   
 
Specifically, we suppose that:   
 
Prob (request male)  =  Pi
M   = (b + d)xi + ei
M   
 
Prob (request female) = Pi
F  = (-b + d)xi + ei
F ,     where i indexes ads. 
 
Thus, the parameter  bk gives the effect of ad characteristic xk on firms’ relative preference 
towards men (z), and dk gives its effect on firms’ propensity to restrict in general (-z*).  (To simplify the 
presentation, note that this notation departs slightly from the body of the paper, where b and d determine 
the underlying indexes, not the probability itself.)   
 
Then, if we estimate separate linear probability models for Pi
M and Pi
F :  
 
Pi
M   = β
Mxi + ei
M          
 
Pi
F  =   β
Fxi + ei
F ,           
 
the estimated coefficients will exactly identify b and d,  because    
 
(A5)   β
M = b + d,   and  
 
(A6)   β
F = -b + d.   
 
 
After solving (A5) and (A6), for b and d, columns (1)-(6) of Table A1 then decompose the 





Mx) =  Var(bx) + Var(dx) + 2Cov(bx,dx)  
 
Var(β
Fx) =   Var(bx) + Var(dx) - 2Cov(bx,dx).  
 
The regression specifications underlying columns (1)-(6) are identical to those in Tables 4 and 5.  
Column 7 decomposes the unexplained variance in the same manner, using the residuals ei
M and ei
F, 
from the column 6 regressions  29 
 
 
Table A1:  Variance Decomposition for Determinants of Gender Preferences 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 











Firm*Occ  Variance in 
Specification (6) 
Variance in Advertised 
Preferences for Men:          
 
1. Total   
 .026  .061  .082  .149  .324  .639  .361 
2. Related to tastes and 
productivities (z)   .007  .032  .042  .073  .143  .324  .182 
3. Related to frictions  
(-z*) .020  .035  .043  .070  .166  .303  .150 
4. Related to covariance 
between these   .000  -.007  -.004  .006  .016  .013  .030 
Variance in Advertised 
Preferences for Women:            
5. Total   
 .030  .081  .098  .150  .319  .671  .329 
6. Related to tastes and 
productivities (z)   .008  .035  .046  .080  .156  .354  .198 
7. Related to frictions  
(-z*) .021  .039  .047  .077  .181  .331  .164 
8. Related to covariance 
between these   .000  .007  .004  -.006  -.017  -.014  -.032 
 
 
With the exception of column 1, rows 2 and 3 are approximately equal.  So are rows 6 and 7.  We conclude that variation in z and z* contribute 
about equally to the observed variance in advertised preferences for men.  The same is true for women.     30
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Advertised Education Requirement 






University  Combined 
Gender requirement        
No gender preference  .766  .892  .938  .895 
Prefer male?  .120  .049  .042  .055 
Prefer female?  .114  .059  .021  .050 
Advertised Experience requirement        
Unspecified .343  .204  .136  .194 
1 Year or less  .030  .013  .005  .012 
1 to 3 years  .467  .482  .287  .399 
3 to 5 years  .120  .209  .305  .237 
5 to 10 years  .037  .085  .232  .139 
10 Years or above  .004  .007  .037  .019 
        
Job is Part Time  .015 .008  .009  .009 
Number of positions advertised:        
Unspecified .546  .483  .456  .480 
1 .159  .260  .358  .287 
2 .089  .104  .094  .098 
3-5 .102  .094  .067  .084 
6-15 .070  .046  .021  .038 
16-50 .028  .013  .005  .011 
51+ .006  .001  .000  .001 
B.  FIRM CHARACTERISTICS        
Firm size (number of workers):        
1-19  .067 .071  .081  .075 
20-99  .333 .336  .316  .327 
100-499  .332 .325  .335  .330 
500-999  .108 .097  .095  .098 
1,000-9,999  .124 .134  .138  .135 
10,000 +  .035 .036  .036  .036 
Firm ownership type:*        
       Private, Domestic  .672  .606  .477  .561 
Foreign   .259 .326  .430  .360 
NonProfit  .003 .003  .005  .004 
State-Owned Enterprise   .066 .065  .087  .074 
Government  .000 .000  .001  .001 
        
Number of Ads  136,595 482,697 438,246  1,057,538 
 
* “Private, Domestic” includes privately held companies, publicly-traded companies and reformed State-Owned 
Enterprises where a majority of shares are still owned by the state.  “Foreign” includes Foreign Direct Investment, 
joint ventures, plus a small number of representative offices.     31
 
 
Table 2:  Advertised Gender Preferences, by Firm   
  
  Share of Firms Specifying a Preference For:   
Total Number of Ads 
Placed by the Firm: 
Any  
Gender 
Men Women  Both 
Genders 
N 
  1  .165  .056  .109  .000  12,834 
  2-10  .326  .155  .224  .053  41,233 
  11-50  .549  .345  .392  .188  16,343 
  51 and over  .708  .536  .560  .388  3,792 






   32 
Table 3:  Maximum Likelihood and OLS estimates of structural parameters (b and d) and associated marginal effects.   
 
  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  OLS Estimates  
  b d  ∂(P
M+P
F) /∂x  ∂(P
M-P
F) /∂x  ∂(P
M+P
F) /∂x  ∂(P
M-P
F) /∂x 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education Requirement:        
Some  Postsecondary  -.1090** -.2899** -.0962** -.0300** -.1215** -.0267** 
  (.0041) (.0028) (.0009) (.0008) (.0009) (.0010) 
University  .0173** -.4289** -.1390** -.0101** -.1616** -.0109** 
  (.0046) (.0030) (.0010) (.0009) (.0010) (.0011) 
Experience Requirement:        
1-3  years  .0948** -.0516** -.0150** .0166** -.0202** .0273** 
  (.0039) (.0024) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009) 
3-5  years  .3084** -.1047** -.0283** .0560** -.0304** .0656** 
  (.0048) (.0028) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0010) 
More  than  5  years  .4664** -.1022** -.0246** .0865** -.0157** .0878** 
  (.0060) (.0033) (.0010) (.0011) (.0010) (.0011) 
        
Log (Firm Size)  .0213** -.0040** -.0009** .0040** -.0013** .0046** 
  (.0008) (.0005) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Firm Ownership Type:        
    Foreign Ownership   -.0359**  -.1266**  -.0418**  -.0109**  -.0380**  -.0101** 
  (.0035) (.0019) (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) (.0007) 
    Non-profit                            -.0192  -.0182  -.0063  -.0043  -.0097  -.0038 
Organization (.0248)  (.0143)  (.0046) (.0048) (.0048) (.0051) 
    State-owned                 .0777**  -.0241**  -.0064**  .0142**  -.0081**  .0147** 
Enterprise  (.0059) (.0035) (.0011) (.0011) (.0012) (.0012) 
     Government   .2534**  .1665**  .0588**  .0540**  .0743**  .0821** 
  (.0513) (.0338) (.0107) (.0096) (.0110) (.0118) 
 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
Regressions also control for the number of vacancies advertised, a dummy for part-time jobs and period fixed effects in both equations.  The omitted firm type is for-profit 
firms with no government or foreign connection.  Sample size = 1,057,538 ads   33 
Table 4:  Effects of Selected Covariates on Employers’ Tendency to Gender-Target Ads (-z*), Linear Probability Model Estimates: 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education Requirement:        
Some  Postsecondary  -.1204** -.0743** -.0688** -.0681** -.0923** -.0602** 
  (.0073) (.0050) (.0048) (.0048) (.0044) (.0049) 
University  -.1585** -.1005** -.0947** -.0944** -.1220** -.0808** 
  (.0092) (.0057) (.0055) (.0056) (.0059) (.0058) 
Experience Requirement:        
1-3  years  -.0203** -.0158** -.0176** -.0179** -.0250** -.0220** 
  (.0030) (.0023) (.0023) (.0024) (.0024) (.0025) 
3-5  years  -.0302** -.0324** -.0327** -.0324** -.0394** -.0325** 
  (.0041) (.0027) (.0027) (.0027) (.0044) (.0032) 
More  than  5  years  -.0154** -.0290** -.0277** -.0292** -.0359** -.0345** 
  (.0048) (.0035) (.0034) (.0033) (.0049) (.0038) 
        
Log (Firm Size)  -.0017*  -.0028** -.0034** -.0034**     
  (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0005)     
Firm Ownership Type:        
    Foreign Ownership   -.0309**  -.0313**  -.0308**  -.0305**     
  (.0025) (.0027) (.0026) (.0027)     
    Non-profit                                    -.0070  -.0059  -.0072  -.0013     
Organization  (.0104) (.0099) (.0097) (.0099)     
    State-owned                 -.0054  -.0061  -.0049  -.0034     
Enterprise  (.0042) (.0036) (.0032) (.0032)     
     Government   .0699**  .0680**  .0742**  .0711*     
  (.0272) (.0230) (.0287) (.0313)     
        


















2   .043 .078 .096 .156 .366 .669 
 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   OLS estimates.  Regressions also control for a the number of vacancies advertised, a dummy for part-time jobs, and period fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the occupation*province level.  The omitted firm type is for-profit firms with no government or foreign connection.  Sample size = 1,057,538 ads.   34 
Table 5:  Effects of Selected Covariates on Employers’ Relative Valuation of Men (z), Linear Probability Model Estimates: 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education Requirement:        
Some  Postsecondary  -.0256*  -.0052 -.0053 -.0029  -.0443**  -.0125 
  (.0112) (.0067) (.0064) (.0064) (.0094) (.0082) 
University  -.0071 .0044 .0057 .0097  -.0323**  .0005 
  (.0125) (.0077) (.0075) (.0076) (.0103) (.0089) 
Experience Requirement:        
1-3  years  .0275** .0170** .0138** .0127** .0258** .0131** 
  (.0036) (.0027) (.0026) (.0027) (.0037) (.0030) 
3-5  years  .0657** .0430** .0407** .0397** .0624** .0387** 
  (.0070) (.0045) (.0045) (.0047) (.0077) (.0057) 
More  than  5  years  .0869** .0616** .0599** .0573** .0787** .0486** 
  (.0082) (.0056) (.0056) (.0057) (.0089) (.0068) 
        
Log (Firm Size)  .0042** .0046** .0045** .0047**     
  (.0007) (.0006) (.0007) (.0007)     
Firm Ownership Type:        
    Foreign Ownership   -.0072**  -.0101**  -.0088**  -.0080**     
  (.0022) (.0022) (.0021) (.0021)     
    Non-profit                                    -.0028  .0018  -.0010  .0059     
Organization  (.0092) (.0100) (.0092) (.0094)     
    State-owned                 .0160**  .0129**  .0144**  .0141**     
Enterprise  (.0035) (.0030) (.0030) (.0029)     
     Government   .0831  .1087*  .0908  .0666     
  (.0417) (.0502) (.0469) (.0329)     
        


















2   .014 .064 .084 .144 .282 .640 
 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   OLS estimates.  Regressions also control for a the number of vacancies advertised, a dummy for part-time jobs, and period fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the occupation*province level.  The omitted firm type is for-profit firms with no government or foreign connection.  Sample size = 1,057,538 ads.  35 
Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics for other “discriminatory” preferences 
 







University  Combined 
Age requirement       
No age restrictions  .604  .733  .831  .757 
Minimum age requirement?  .287  .192  .108  .169 
Maximum age requirement?   .348  .218  .139  .202 
Both minimum and maximum age requirement  .239  .143 .077 .128 
Minimum age, when required   22.31  24.95  28.10  25.20 
Maximum age, when required  34.70  35.54  37.78  35.99 
Beauty requirement       
      Job requires beauty (“xingxiang”)  .146  .091 .041 .077 
      Requires beauty given preference for men  .072  .048  .046  .054 
      Requires beauty given preference for women  .400  .361  .343  .369 
      Requires beauty given no gender preference   .120  .075  .034  .063 
Type of Height requirement       
Any height requirement?  .093  .022  .009  .026 
A single height requirement and preference  for  men  .023  .002 .001 .004 
A single height requirement and preference  for  women  .037  .011 .003 .011 
One gender-independent height requirement  .027  .008 .004 .009 
Two gender-specific height requirements  .006  .001  .001  .002 
       Requires height given preference  for  men  .183  .024 .017 .067 
       Requires height given preference for women  .321  .177  .153  .215 
       Requires height given no gender preference   .045  .012  .005  .013 
Minimum heights required (centimeters)       
Minimum male height, given preference for men   166.5  168.2  169.2  167.1 
Minimum female height, given preference for women   161.0  162.8  163.2  162.1 
Minimum common height requirement  165.6  164.5  166.1  165.2 
Minimum male height, given gender-specific  requirements    170.4  171.5 172.0 171.0 
Minimum female height, given gender-specific  requirements  161.5  162.5 164.0 162.2 
   36 
Table 7:  Effects of Selected Covariates on Preferences for Other ‘US-Prohibited’ Characteristics:  
 
  Relative Valuation of Older 
Workers (Any Minimum Age? 
– Any Maximum Age?) 
Propensity to Age-Target Ads 






  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Education Requirement:              
Some  Postsecondary  .0123**  .0219**  -.1468**  -.0784**  -.0248** -.0298** -.0336** -.0342** 
  (.0045)  (.0038)  (.0078)  (.0089)  (.0042) (.0046) (.0039) (.0037) 
University  -.0051  .0319**  -.2627**  -.1108**  -.0420** -.0442** -.0367** -.0389** 
  (.0046)  (.0042)  (.0101)  (.0100)  (.0043) (.0053) (.0039) (.0044) 
Experience Requirement:              
1-3  years  -.0056** -.0047* -.0341** -.0089*  -.0157**  -.0162**  -.0126**  -.0132** 
  (.0021)  (.0023)  (.0056)  (.0044)  (.0020) (.0027) (.0016) (.0022) 
3-5  years  .0120**  .0108** -.0001 .0140**  -.0424**  -.0400**  -.0200**  -.0224** 
  (.0029)  (.0031)  (.0070)  (.0052)  (.0041) (.0055) (.0024) (.0038) 
More than 5 years  .0240**  .0243**  .0535**  .0584**  -.0516**  -.0473**  -.0202**  -.0252** 
  (.0036)  (.0036)  (.0093)  (.0073)  (.0045) (.0059) (.0025) (.0043) 
              
Log (Firm Size)  .0000    .0136**   -.0026**   .0005  
  (.0008)    (.0021)    (.0006)  (.0003)  
Firm Ownership Type:              
    Foreign Ownership   .0140**    -.0844**    -.0072**    -.0033**   
  (.0018)    (.0068)    (.0023)  (.0010)  
    Non-profit                              -.0784**    .0255    .0089    .0078   
Organization  (.0112)    (.0201)    (.0118)  (.0061)  
    State-owned                 -.0382**    -.0285**    -.0113**    -.0052**   
Enterprise  (.0037)    (.0070)    (.0028)  (.0014)  
     Government   -.0583    .0295    .0075    .0345   
  (.0371)    (.0843)    (.0569)  (.0325)  
              



























2   .090 .650 .155 .692  .170  .659  .217  .668 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   OLS estimates.  Regressions also control for a the number of vacancies advertised, a dummy for part-time jobs and period fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the occupation*province level.  The omitted firm type is for-profit firms with no government or foreign connection.  Sample size = 1,057,369 ads.   37 
 
Table 8:  Effects of Advertised Wages on Gender and Other Preferences  
 
 
  Dependent Variable: 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 


















         
1.Occupation*Industry*     .0043  -.0497**  .0256**  .0191  -.0188**  -.0026 
        Province  (.0053)  (.0040)  (.0059)  (.0106)  (.0042)  (.0027) 
         
2. Occupation*firm,   .0150 -.0405**  .0098  .0136  -.0180** -.0097* 
       Province  (.0089)  (.0058)  (.0061)  (.0132)  (.0055)  (.0041) 
 
 
Notes:  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   OLS estimates.  Sample size = 173,945 ads. 
 
All regressions also control for education and experience requirements, the number of vacancies advertised, a dummy for part-time jobs, and 
period fixed effects.  Row 1 regressions also control for firm size and ownership.  Standard errors are clustered at the occupation*province 
level.  All wages are measured in logs.    38
 
Figure 1: Occupation Fixed Effects, by Mean Education Requirements 
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Figure 2: Occupation Fixed Effects for Age, Beauty and Height, by Mean Education Requirements 
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